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ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL LEASES—IT’S TIME TO
AMEND BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTION 365
ABSTRACT
For far too long, Bankruptcy Code Section 365 has caused confusion among
parties to oil and gas leases when one party files for bankruptcy. This section of
the Bankruptcy Code is intended to provide relief to debtors who are party to an
unexpired lease or an executory contract, allowing a debtor-in-possession or
trustee to make the decision to either assume or reject the agreement. While this
concept is straightforward for standard lease agreements and contracts, courts
have struggled to determine whether oil and gas leases actually fall into the
category of a “lease” per se, an executory contract, or neither.
Many courts have held that oil and gas agreements are not actually leases,
despite their title, because they convey an interest in real property that exceeds
that of a leasehold interest. Some courts, however, have chosen to categorize
such agreements as unexpired leases, or even executory contracts. This
variation in court decisions is problematic because determining what category
to place an oil and gas agreement is of paramount importance in determining
whether the debtor has the right to reject the agreement in a bankruptcy
proceeding. Additionally, such variation has had the effect of producing
shocking results during bankruptcy proceedings, leaving parties to current oil
and gas agreements unsure of their contractual and property rights in the event
that a counterparty experiences financial distress.
To alleviate the uncertainty caused by the current caselaw, this Comment
proposes an amendment to Bankruptcy Code Section 365 that provides a
framework for consistency in evaluating oil and gas leases moving forward and
protections for the property rights of the contracting parties.
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INTRODUCTION
Historically, Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) Section 365 has benefited
debtors seeking relief of obligations under unexpired leases and executory
contracts. However, despite this generally positive treatment of debtor interests,
the issue of whether Section 365 should apply to relieve (debtor) parties to oil
and gas leases remains a point of debate among the courts. Code Section 365
allows the trustee to assume or reject an executory contract or unexpired lease
of a debtor.1 More specifically, this section of the Code aims, not only to relieve
debtors from their existing obligations under leases and contracts,2 but also to
prevent third parties from ceasing business dealings with debtors.3 In furtherance
of these goals, Section 365 gives debtors the option to either assume the
contracts and/or leases that benefit their estate, or reject those that do not serve
such interests.4
Agreements between landowners and producers of oil and gas are often
memorialized in “leases.” A plain reading of the word “lease” in such
agreements may cause one to assume that these agreements fall within the
1

11 U.S.C § 365(a) (2005).
See Cottman Transmissions, Inc. v. Holland Enterprises, Inc. (In re Holland Enterprises), 25 B.R. 301,
302 (E.D.N.C. 1982).
3
See Richmond Leasing Co. v. Cap. Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 1310 (5th Cir. 1985).
4
See River Prod., Co. v. Webb (In re Topco, Inc.), 894 F.2d 727, 741 (5th Cir. 1990).
2
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purview of Section 365, thereby allowing a trustee or debtor in possession to
assume or reject an agreement in the case of a bankruptcy filing. Yet, some
courts argue that, with respect to oil and gas leases, the term “lease” is misnomer
because such leases are categorically different from the typical leases governed
by landlord-tenant law.5 This distinction hinges on the argument that the type of
interest conveyed in an oil and gas lease is often more substantial than that of a
typical lease agreement. Thus, the use of this terminology has led to disparate
results when courts attempt to address how the agreements should be treated
during a bankruptcy proceeding. Because it is often unclear what interest in real
property has been conveyed to the “lessee,” courts are left to grapple with state
property law when determining whether an oil and gas lease may be assumed or
rejected under the purview of Section 365.6
The recent decline in oil and gas production,7 paired with the economic
downturn caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, will likely elicit an increase in
bankruptcy litigation over oil and gas leases,8 thus demanding a uniform
standard for addressing the treatment of such leases under Section. Therefore,
this Comment will explore the various positions taken by courts among the
several states, exploit the problematic nature of a lack of consistency in those
court rulings, and propose a solution that provides clarity to parties entering oil
and gas leases in the future. Because the current Code does not provide courts
with guidance on the treatment of oil and gas agreements, parties entering into
oil and gas leases are often ill-equipped to plan for the possibility of insolvency
by another contracting party. Consequently, the current Code should be
amended to incorporate such guidance.
I.

BACKGROUND

In a bankruptcy proceeding, contract and property questions generally arise
under state law and, therefore, must be evaluated pursuant to relevant state law
unless a countervailing federal interest exists.9 When evaluating Code Section
365 in the context of standard landlord-tenant agreements, the language and
application of the statute is clear. With a few exceptions, and “subject to the

5

Id. at 739 n.17.
See generally id.; Texaco, Inc. v. La. Land & Expl. Co., 136 B.R. 658, 662 (M.D. La. 1992).
7
See U.S. Oil and Natural Gas Wells by Production Rate, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.
gov/petroleum/wells/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2022).
8
See Bankruptcy Filings by US Energy Producers at Four-Year High, OIL & GAS 360 (Aug. 2, 2020),
https://www.oilandgas360.com/bankruptcy-filings-by-us-energy-producers-at-four-year-high/.
9
Frontier Energy, LLC v. Aurora Energy, Ltd. (In re Aurora Oil & Gas Corp.), 439 B.R. 674, 680
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010).
6

HUDSON_5.9.22

320

5/11/2022 9:01 AM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

court’s approval,” the trustee in these standard agreements “may assume or
reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.”10 When adhering
to the common use of the word “lease” to guide our understanding of this statute,
there are certain scenarios in which there the term has an obvious meaning. For
example, a party to a standard lease agreement is unlikely to argue that a building
lease for a term of years conveys any interest other than a leasehold interest in
real property. However, because the interest conveyed in an oil and gas
agreement differs from that of a landlord-tenant agreement, this understanding
of the term “lease” fails to adequately capture the nature of such agreements.11
A lessee in the example above has the right to occupy the building for a term of
years, and at the end of the lease, he must either vacate the premises or renew
the lease for another term. However, oil and gas leases are often structured in
such a way that the “lessee”—who is typically an oil and gas producer—has the
right to occupy and use the land until the oil reserve becomes depleted. This
open-ended type of conveyance begs the question: is the conveyance actually a
leasehold or something more?
Assuming that an oil and gas lease might be something other than a “lease,”
we must also determine whether such a “lease” might, instead, constitute an
executory contract pursuant to the language of the statute.12 When making this
determination, the first question is: what is an executory contract?
Unfortunately, the Code does not provide a definition. However, in an effort to
ascertain its meaning from other sources, courts have looked to the “Countryman
Definition” of executory contracts, which sets forth two distinct limitations for
their scope.13 First, contracts in which the obligations of both parties are
materially underperformed at the time of the bankruptcy filing are executory
contracts.14 Second, contracts in which either party has fully performed do not
constitute executory contracts, regardless of whether the nonperforming party is
the bankrupt party15 or the non-bankrupt party.16 Additionally, while Section

10

11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2018).
In re Topco, Inc., 894 F.2d at 739 n.17.
12
Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2018).
13
See generally NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522 n.6 (1984) (citing S. Rep. No. 95-989,
p. 58 (1977) (“The Bankruptcy code furnishes no express definition of an executory contract, see 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(a) (1982 ed.), but the legislative history of [Section] 365(a) indicates that Congress intended the term to
mean a contract ‘on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides.’”).
14
See Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 461 (1973)
(“[C]ourts have treated a variety of contracts as executory contracts under the Act where the obligations of both
the bankrupt and the other contracting party remained at least partially and materially underperformed at
bankruptcy.”).
15
See id. at 451.
16
See id. at 458.
11
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365 does not expressly state what definition courts should apply, legislative
history suggests that Congress supports a definition consistent with the
Countryman meaning, and notes that executory contracts do not typically consist
of agreements in which the only obligation remaining for one party is payment
to the other party.17
Because an oil and gas lease may be interpreted as conveying something
other than a leasehold interest, the term “lease” within Section 365 must be
interpreted in a way that makes sense within the legislative intent of the Code as
a whole. A primary objective of the Code is to provide an “honest but
unfortunate debtor” with a fresh start.18 This purpose raises the question of
whether the treatment of oil and gas leases as executory contracts or unexpired
leases—subject to rejection pursuant to the debtor’s “business judgment”—is at
odds with the idea of an “honest” debtor.19 When courts decline to recognize
that oil and gas leases convey anything more than a leasehold interest, they often
defer to the debtor’s business judgment as to whether the lease should be
assumed or rejected— opening up the possibility of a savvy lessee rejecting any
lease on the table regardless of the actual feasibility of its continued performance
or potential consequences of its rejection for other contracting parties.20
State courts vary in their level of experience interpreting oil and gas leases,
and, consequently, tend to reach differing conclusions when determining
whether such agreements convey a freehold interest, leasehold interest, or no
interest at all.21 Further, a court’s perspective as to whether an oil and gas lease
is subject to Code Section 365 depends on whether state law recognizes such
agreements as conveying a vested fee interest in real property.22 Though many

17
See S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 58 (1978) (“Though there is no precise definition of what contracts are
executory, it generally includes contracts on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides. A
note is not usually an executory contract if the only performance that remains is repayment.”).
18
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (“[I]t gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor . . .
a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of
preexisting debt.”).
19
See Laura Coordes, Don’t Assume It’s a Lease! Applying § 365 to Oil and Gas Conveyances, AM.
BANKR. INST. (May 3, 2017, 5:16 PM), https://www.abi.org/committee-post/don’t-assume-it’s-a-lease-applying-§-365-tooil-and-gas-conveyances (discussing the decision in In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. 66 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2016)) (suggesting that the allowance of the rejection of a midstream oil and gas lease may encourage oil
production companies to file for bankruptcy with the intention of rejecting undesirable leases).
20
See In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. 66, 71 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016).
21
See supra note 19.
22
See River Prod., Co. v. Webb (In re Topco, Inc.), 894 F.2d 727, 739 n.17 (5th Cir. 1990) (explaining
that states which recognize oil and gas leases as conveying of a freehold interest in real property, it is unlikely
that such agreements will be treated as unexpired leases).
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jurisdictions do not view oil and gas leases as unexpired leases, exceptions do
exist.23
To effectively discern each court’s position on this issue, an understanding
of how the property interests at stake are commonly defined becomes necessary.
As noted supra, many courts begin their analysis by determining what interest
in real property has been conveyed by the lease in question.24 A fee interest in
property, often referred to as a “fee simple,” is defined as “[a]n interest in land
that, being the broadest property interest allowed by law, endures until the
current holder dies without heirs.”25 However, this definition of a fee interest is
not helpful when discussing oil and gas leases. The fee interest, more commonly
recognized in terms of oil and gas agreements, is that of the fee simple
determinable. A fee simple determinable is “[a]n estate that will automatically
end and revert to the grantor if some specified event occurs.”26 Although not
every court uses the term “fee simple determinable” when discussing oil and gas
leases, this type of interest makes the most sense in context, at least one court
discusses the possibility of the interest in property ceasing at the time oil is no
longer produced.27 However, the time at which such an interest “vests” is also at
issue in many of the cases discussed infra. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the
term “vested” as “[h]aving become a completed, consummated right for present
or future enjoyment.”28 Additionally, it is helpful to know exactly what
constitutes “real property.” Real property is defined as “[l]and and anything
growing on, attached to, or erected on it, excluding anything that may be severed
without injury to the land.”29 Piecing together the above definitions, a “vested
fee interest in real property” is a current or future right to enter and use land.30
Another type of interest commonly discussed by courts during analysis of
oil and gas leases is that of the leasehold interest. A leasehold is “[a] tenant’s
possessory estate in land or premises.”31 This definition is vague,—it tells us
very little about the type of interest conveyed. However, Black’s Law Dictionary

23
See Frontier Energy, LLC v. Aurora Energy, Ltd. (In re Aurora Oil & Gas Corp.), 439 B.R. 674, 678
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010) (departing from the notions of other jurisdictions that oil and gas leases convey a
freehold interest in real property).
24
See, e.g., In re Topco, Inc., 894 F.2d at 740.
25
Fee Simple, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
26
Fee Simple Determinable, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
27
See, e.g., Frontier Energy, LLC, 439 B.R. at 676.
28
Vest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
29
Real Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
30
See Vest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Fee Simple, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2019); Real Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
31
Leasehold, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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provides that “[a]lthough a leasehold has some of the characteristics of real
property, it has historically been classified as a chattel real.”32 Looking to the
definition of “chattel real,” one will find that it is defined as “[a] real-property
interest that is less than a freehold or fee.”33 In summary, many courts are
looking to determine what level of interest is conveyed by an oil and gas lease.34
If a fee interest is conveyed, the lessee has greater rights than those of a lessee
who conveyed only a leasehold interest.
Due to the variety of oil and gas agreements currently used in the industry,
it is also prudent to understand each type before exploring existing caselaw.
Many of the cases discussed below relate to upstream oil and gas agreements.
Upstream oil and gas agreements are agreements “[o]f, relating to, or involving
the exploration and production activities of oil companies and their contractors,
including the drilling of wells onshore, the use of land rigs, and onshore
operations in support of offshore activities.”35 On the other end of the spectrum,
there are downstream agreements, which are agreements “relating to, or
involving the process by which hydrocarbons are brought to market, including
refining, processing, petrochemical transportation, and marketing of refined
hydrocarbon products.”36 Midstream, while not defined in Black’s Law
Dictionary, is commonly understood as the part of the oil and gas chain where
products of upstream operations are moved, stored, or processed to prepare such
products for downstream use.37 Moreover, while upstream agreements are likely
to contemplate drilling operations, midstream agreements are more likely to
pertain to pipeline transportation or well storage of oil and gas products intended
to eventually be brought to the downstream market. Specifically, “gas gathering”
agreements discussed below are midstream agreements pertaining to systems of
pipelines with the intent to use such pipelines to gather and move gas.38
Having delineated the many concepts present in the caselaw surrounding oil
and gas agreements, the next step in understanding the problematic nature of
these agreements with respect to the Code is to explore the caselaw. Below are

32

Id.
Chattel Real, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
34
See generally In re Clark Res., Inc., 68 B.R. 358; In re Frederick Petroleum Corp., 98 B.R. 762;
Energetics, Ltd. v. Whitmill, 497 N.W.2d 497.
35
Upstream, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
36
Downstream, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
37
Bethel Afework et al., Midstream Oil and Gas Industry, U. CALGARY: ENERGY EDUC., https://
energyeducation.ca/encyclopedia/Midstream_oil_and_gas_industry (last updated Jan. 31, 2020).
38
See Alta Mesa Holdings, LP v. Kingfisher Midstream, LLC (In re Alta Mesa Res., Inc.), 613 B.R. 90,
96 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2019) (“The intent of the parties was to build a gathering system of pipelines from the
initial receipt points to market delivery points.”).
33
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examples of how courts have ruled in such cases in a few states to demonstrate
the varying outcomes.
A. Texas
As the nation’s largest oil producer,39 Texas seems the most appropriate
starting point for identifying varying ways in which courts have chosen to handle
property interests created by oil and gas leases. In Texas, oil and gas leases
convey a freehold interest in land and therefore are not treated as unexpired
leases or executory contracts.40 In an oft cited footnote, the court in In re Topco
noted that, “[t]he term ‘oil and gas lease’ is a misnomer because the interest
created by an oil and gas lease is not the same as an interest created by a lease
governed by landlord and tenant law.”41 Though the footnote in Topco is largely
regarded as dicta, it is supported by the Texas Supreme Court decision in
Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, in which the court held that an oil and gas
lease executed by a landowner and a third party violated a preemptive right to
purchase oil and gas as granted in the original deed.42 Perhaps providing the
clearest explanation of how courts treat oil and gas leases in Texas, the court in
Good Hope Refineries, Inc. v. Benavides noted that “Texas courts characterize
the conveyance as creating a determinable fee interest in the minerals in place,
which interest reverts automatically to the grantor upon failure to drill or pay.”43
Although the aforementioned precedent exists in Texas with respect to
upstream oil and gas agreements (agreements contemplating exploration and
drilling),44 the more recent decision in In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp. has created
new concerns for parties to similar midstream agreements.45 Midstream
agreements contemplate the transportation and storage of oil and gas products
by way of pipelines, tanks and other infrastructure.46 Despite the fact that the
39
Oil and Petroleum Products Explained: Where Our Oil Comes From, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/where-our-oil-comes-from.php (last visited
Feb. 13, 2021).
40
See River Prod., Co. v. Webb (In re Topco, Inc.), 894 F.2d 727, 739 n.17 (5th Cir. 1990).
41
Id. at 739 n.17.
42
Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 741 S.W.2d 377, 379, 380 (Tex. 1987).
43
Good Hope Refineries, Inc. v. Benavides, 602 F.2d 998, 1001 (1st Cir. 1979).
44
Upstream? Midstream? Downstream? What’s the Difference?, ENERGYHQ, https://energyhq.com/
2017/04/upstream-midstream-downstream-whats-the-difference/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
45
James Roberts, Trouble Down the Pipeline? What Sabine Oil & Gas Corp. May Mean For The
Midstream Service Sector, LEXOLOGY, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2d632978-89cf-4ff6916c-acca99075a25 (“Should the Court’s decision be replicated by other bankruptcy courts, the threat to
midstream service providers of not being able to recover the funds already spent could affect negotiation
dynamics between distressed producers and service providers.”).
46
Supra note 44.
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agreements in dispute concerned pipelines in Texas, Sabine Oil & Gas Corp.
filed its bankruptcy petition in the Southern District of New York.47 The court
held that the debtor’s midstream gas gathering agreements should be treated as
executory contracts which could be rejected pursuant to Section 365 of the Code,
noting that it would be a “reasonable exercise of business judgment.”48 The
subsequent decisions of this case are of equal or perhaps greater importance in
understanding the confusion surrounding these agreements with respect to
Section 365 due to potential implications for third parties. Sabine sought and
was granted a declaratory judgment stating that the agreements did not include
covenants running with the land.49 The decision was later affirmed by the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.50
B. Louisiana
In Louisiana, there seems to be disagreement among the courts on how to
treat oil and gas leases—in some cases, courts have ruled that Section 365 does
not apply to oil and gas leases, whereas in others, they are treated as executory
contracts subject to Section 365.51 Louisiana derives its notions of property
rights from the French Civil Code, creating an even broader variation in
interpretation.52 While some courts have ruled that oil and gas leases are not
unexpired leases or executory contracts, at least one court has ruled that an oil
and gas lease is in fact an executory contract.53 In a somewhat perplexing
decision, the court in Texaco, Inc. v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co.
described mineral leases as conveying “real rights,”54 yet reached the conclusion
that a mineral lease was an executory contract.55 This decision seemingly

47

In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. 66, 69 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016).
Id. at 79.
49
Sabine Oil & Gas Corp. v. HPIP Gonzales Holdings, LLC (In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp.), 550 B.R.
59, 62 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016).
50
Sabine Oil & Gas Corp. v. Nordheim Eagle Ford Gathering, LLC (In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp.), 734
F. App’x 64, 65 (2d Cir. 2018).
51
See Texaco, Inc. v. La. Land & Expl. Co., 136 B.R. 658, 668 (M.D. La. 1992) (holding that a mineral
lease was an executory contract); In re WRT Energy Corp., 202 B.R. 579, 585 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1996) (holding
that mineral leases were not unexpired leases or executory contracts).
52
See generally Leonard Oppenheim, Louisiana’s Civil Law Heritage, 42 L. LIBR. J. 249, 253-54 (1949)
(Property law in Louisiana finds its origins in the French and Roman Civil Codes, which in effect creates
terminology and doctrines that differ from those of states with legal roots in English common law.).
53
See Texaco, Inc., 136 B.R. at 668 (holding that a mineral lease was an executory contract); In re WRT
Energy Corp., 202 B.R. at 585 (holding that mineral leases were not unexpired leases or executory contracts).
54
Texaco, Inc., 136 B.R. at 666. Louisiana courts use the term “real right” synonymously with
“proprietary interest,” implying that the term refers to an ownership interest in property. Edward C. Abell Jr.,
Real Rights in Louisiana, 21 LA. L. REV. 462, 463 (1960).
55
Texaco, Inc., 136 B.R. at 668.
48
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suggests that even if a court recognizes an interest in real property other than a
leasehold interest, that interest can be subverted simply by calling the agreement
an executory contract. Additionally, in the courts analysis of executory
contracts, the Countryman definition is discussed at length—yet the court
reached the conclusion that the lessee had a continuing obligation to perform
and deemed the agreement an executory contract.56 The court, however, failed
to recognize that the lessee’s continuing obligations to make payments to the
lessor is not typically considered underperformance pursuant to the Countryman
definition of executory contracts.57 The Texaco decision to treat a mineral lease
as an executory contract has been met with criticism, particularly by the court in
In re WRT Energy Corp.58
Judge Parker discussed the nature of the OG&ML [Oil, Gas and
Mineral Lease] at length, and, further, discussed the difference
between the mineral lease and other more standard lease contracts.
Then, unexpectedly, he avoided deciding the issue . . . Judge Parker
avoided deciding whether the OG&ML was an unexpired lease within
the meaning of [S]ection 365(a), choosing instead to base his decision
on a finding that the OG&ML was an executory contract.59

The court went on to discuss the decision in In re Ham Consulting Co. holding
that a mineral lease in Louisiana is not an unexpired lease.60 The WRT Energy
court held that mineral leases at issue were not unexpired leases or executory
contracts for purposes of Section 365.61 The debate in the Louisiana courts
exemplifies the broader debate and disagreement throughout the United States
as a whole.
C. Oklahoma
In Oklahoma, courts have found that oil and gas leases fall completely
outside the scope of Section 365, holding that such agreements are neither
unexpired leases nor executory contracts.62 However, the analysis offered by the
court in In re Clark Resources seems to be markedly different from Texas courts
which have reached the same conclusion.63 With respect to the unexpired lease
56

Id. at 667.
See Id. at, 667–68; Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV.
439 (1973).
58
In re WRT Energy Corp., 202 B.R. at 585.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
E.g., In re Clark Res., Inc., 68 B.R. 358, 360 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986).
63
Compare In re Clark Res., Inc., 68 B.R. at 359–60 (holding that oil and gas leases create neither
57
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portion of Section 365, Oklahoma courts have held that oil and gas leases do not
give rise to an “estate in land”, but rather create an “interest or estate in realty.”64
The interest created gives rise to a license to explore, but not a freehold interest
or leasehold interest in real property.65 In Clark, the court looked to the
Countryman definition of executory contracts in making its final determination
that the oil and gas lease could not be rejected.66 The court ascertained that
neither the lessee nor the lessor had complex underperformed obligations under
the agreement.67 The lessee’s only obligation to the lessor was to pay, and the
lessor’s only obligation to the lessee was to “defend their title to the lease land
and not to interfere with the lessee’s drilling operation.”68 Thus, the agreement
was not an executory contract.69
The court in Clark modeled much of its analysis after the slightly earlier
decision in In re Heston Oil Co., where the court noted that the term “lease” fails
to adequately describe the relationship between parties to such agreements.70
Both the court in Heston and the court in Clark discussed the prior decision in
In re J.H. Land & Cattle Co., noting that the J.H. Land court’s finding that oil
and gas leases could be rejected pursuant to Section 365 was at odds with the
Oklahoma Supreme Court’s view of the interests created by oil and gas leases.71
Oddly, the court in J.H. Land did not hold that oil and gas leases create an
interest in real property, but rather an “intangible personal property right.”72 The
court did not consider whether the agreement was an executory contract subject
to rejection pursuant to Section 365.73 Rather, the court held that the agreement

freehold or leasehold interests) with Good Hope Refineries, Inc. v. Benavides, 602 F.2d 998, 1001 (1st Cir.
1979) (holding that oil and gas leases create a determinable fee interest in minerals).
64
In re Clark Res., Inc., 68 B.R. at 358.
65
Id. at 359.
The interest created by an oil and gas lease in Oklahoma is not “real estate” and conveys no real
interest in land itself, it is a chattel real, an incorporeal hereditament and a profit a’ prendre which
is in the nature of a license to explore by drilling and permits the lessee to capture oil and gas
which is then treated as personalty.
Id.
66

Id.
Id. at 359–60.
68
Id. at 360.
69
Id.
70
In re Heston Oil Co., 69 B.R. 34, 36 (N.D. Okla. 1986) (“The Oklahoma Supreme Court in several
cases has considered the characteristics of an oil and gas lease and has found that use of the term ‘lease’ is more
in ‘deference to custom’ than a description of the legal relationship involved.”).
71
Id.; In re Clark Res., Inc., 68 B.R. 358, 359 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986).
72
In re J.H. Land & Cattle Co., 8 B.R. 237, 239 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981).
73
Id. at 238–39.
67
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could be rejected pursuant to a business judgment test.74 While the J.H. Land
opinion has been unpopular and questioned by other courts within the state as
well as courts outside of Oklahoma analyzing Kansas property law with respect
to Section 365, it has not been overturned.75
Turning to the arguably more complex analysis of midstream gas gathering
agreements, such as the agreement discussed above in Sabine,76 the Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of Texas recently had the opportunity to explore
the analysis in Sabine while reaching a differing conclusion in Alta Mesa
Holdings, LP v. Kingfisher Midstream, LLC (In re Alta Mesa Res, Inc.).77 The
gas gathering agreement at issue in Alta Mesa concerned property in Oklahoma,
and was therefore analyzed pursuant to Oklahoma property law.78 The court in
Alta Mesa held that gas gathering agreements convey a leasehold interest in real
property rather than a fee interest,79 however the court also found that this issue
alone is not dispositive of whether the leases in question could be rejected.80 The
movant sought a declaratory judgment, arguing that the gas gathering
agreements could be rejected as executory contracts.81
The court held that the gathering agreements could not be rejected because
they were not executory contracts, but rather leases that formed “real property
covenants running with the land.”82 In its analysis, the court explained that three
factors must be satisfied to form covenants that run with the land.83 “First, the
covenant must touch and concern real property. Second, there must be privity of
estate. Third, the original parties to the covenant must have intended to bind
successors.”84 The court went further to explain each of the elements, first stating
that “[i]f the value of the owner’s interest in the land itself is affected by the
covenant, either positively or negatively, the covenant touches and concerns the

74

Id. at 239.
See Baker Farms, Inc. v. Sandridge E&P, LLC (In re Sandridge Energy, Inc.), No. 16-32488, 2018
Bankr. LEXIS 318, at *32–33 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2018) (questioning the reasoning used in In re J.H. Land
& Cattle and holding that “oil and gas leases are not subject to § 365”); In re Heston Oil Co., 69 B.R. 34, 36
(N.D. Okla. 1986) (questioning the reasoning used in In re J.H. Land & Cattle).
76
E.g., In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. 66, 70 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016).
77
Alta Mesa Holdings, LP v. Kingfisher Midstream, LLC (In re Alta Mesa Res., Inc.), 613 B.R. 90, 102
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2019).
78
Id. at 99–100.
79
Id. at 103.
80
See id. at103–07 (discussing whether the agreement constituted an executory contract).
81
Id. at 100.
82
Id. at 98.
83
Id. at 99.
84
Id. at 100.
75
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land.”85 In this case, the gas gathering agreement created a surface easement
burdening Alta Mesa’s interest in the oil reserves by restricting use of the surface
land.86 During its analysis of whether such covenants touch and concern the land,
the court noted that contrary to the Sabine court’s finding that “surface
easement[s] do[] not touch and concern [] mineral estate[s,] . . . in the context of
an oil and gas lease, the surface easement is integral to the lessee’s ability to
realize the value of its mineral reserves.”87
In its discussion of the second element determining whether a covenant runs
with the land, the court discussed vertical and horizontal privity, noting that
“[v]ertical privity relates to the relationship between the present owner of the
land and the original parties to the covenant[,]”88 while horizontal privity relates
to the “relationship between the original parties to the covenant.”89 Vertical
privity was not at issue in Alta Mesa, however, the parties disputed whether the
existence of horizontal privity was required to create a covenant.90 Ultimately,
this dispute was inconsequential, as the court held that horizontal privity did
exist because the surface easement discussed above relates not only to the
surface of the land, but also to the mineral interests—without the easement, the
lessee would not have the opportunity to realize the value in the deposits below
the surface.91 The court also noted that the Sabine court held that a surface
easement did not create horizontal privity and seemed to suggest that the Sabine
court mistakenly analyzed the easement with respect to a fee mineral estate
rather than an oil and gas leasehold.92
Lastly, the court discussed the third element of covenants running with the
land—intent to bind successors.93 Here the court found that the language of the
agreements was quite clear—each agreement specifically stated that it was “a

85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id. at 102.
Id. at 103–04.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 105.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 102–03, 106.
Id. at 106.
In Sabine, the court found that the gatherer’s surface easement did not create horizontal privity
with respect to the producer’s mineral estate. However, Sabine centered its analysis around fee
mineral estates, not oil and gas leaseholds…Because a surface easement is a crucial component
on an oil and gas lease, the Court does not view this conveyance as creating privity only with
respect to the surface estate.

Id.
93

Id.
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covenant running with the land.”94 In accordance with the analysis it provided,
the court held that the agreements between Alta Mesa, LP and Kingfisher
Midstream, LLC created covenants running with the land and thus they could
not be rejected pursuant to Section 365.95 Although this court recognized that
Sabine was decided on its own facts, it also noted that “[t]o the extent that the
pronouncements in Sabine were intended to be generalized, this Court must
reject them”,96 suggesting that perhaps if the Sabine case had been decided by a
court in Texas rather than New York, the outcome may have been markedly
different.
D. Utah
In Utah, courts have held that midstream oil and gas leases contain covenants
that run with the land and therefore are not subject to rejection under Section
365.97 In light of the above discussion of both Sabine and Alta Mesa, it is worth
noting that the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado also
recently decided a case involving midstream gas gathering agreements
concerning property in Utah.98 Badlands and Alta Mesa were both decided after
Sabine, and notably, both courts made little hesitation in distinguishing
themselves from the Sabine decision.99 Though the facts in Badlands vary
slightly from those in Alta Mesa, the ultimate determination was the same—the
agreements at issue were found to contain covenants running with the land and
therefore, Section 365 does not apply.100 The determination that covenants
running with the land preclude a debtor from rejecting a lease that conveys such
covenants is not at odds with the Sabine decision however—the Sabine court
said as much itself.101 The distinction between these cases can be found, rather,
in the fact that the Sabine court found that the gas gathering agreements at issue
in the case did not contain any covenants running with the land.102

94

id.
Id. at 98–100.
96
Id. at 102.
97
E.g., Monarch Midstream, LLC v. Badlands Prod. Co. (In re Badlands Energy, Inc.), 608 B.R. 854,
870 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019).
98
Id. at 861.
99
Id. at 869 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019); In re Alta Mesa Res., Inc., 613 B.R. at 102.
100
In re Badlands Energy, Inc., 608 B.R. at 875.
101
HPIP Gonzales Holdings, LLC v. Sabine Oil & Gas Corp. (In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp.), 567 B.R.
869, 874 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“[I]t is not possible for a debtor to reject a covenant that ‘runs with the land,’ since
such a covenant creates a property interest that is not extinguished through bankruptcy.”).
102
Id. at 877.
95
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To determine whether the covenants in question were covenants that run
with the land, the Badlands court used similar analysis to that in Alta Mesa.103
In summary, the court looked to whether the covenants touched and concerned
the land, whether both horizontal and vertical privity existed, and whether the
parties to the agreement intended covenants to bind successors.104 On all three
parts of this test, the court determined that each requirement did exist, and
therefore the covenants were covenants running with the land.105
E. Ohio
In Ohio, it remains unclear whether oil and gas leases are subject to rejection
under section 365. Despite Ohio’s dominant presence in the oil industry, there
is surprisingly little relevant case law discussing oil and gas leases with respect
to Section 365. However, the court in In re Frederick Petroleum Corp. provided
vast discussion on the topic, giving insight as to how such agreements are likely
to be treated under Ohio law.106 The court in Fredrick Petroleum Corp. reversed
a subsequent order which held that oil and gas leases conveyed an interest in
nonresidential real property.107 In its discussion, the Ohio court seemingly gave
deference to the decisions in both In re Clark and In re Heston regardless of the
fact that those cases did not touch on Ohio property law at all, stating, “[t]he
court feels that the Ohio courts, if given the opportunity to do so, would
characterize the property interest involved as being like or similar to the interest
recognized under Oklahoma law.”108 In this case, the bankruptcy court held that
certain oil and gas leases had been forfeited and deemed rejected due to failure
of the trustee and the debtor to assume or reject the leases within the statutory
60 day period.109 However, the district court noted that rejection of the leases
could result in a “windfall to the lessor” and “deprive the estate” of a potentially
“valuable asset.”110 Furthermore, the court thoughtfully analyzed the effect of
such a rejection or forfeiture on third parties to oil and gas leases.111
On the other hand, since interests in oil and gas leases may be divided
through multiple assignments, the failure of the trustee to act within
sixty days and the resultant forfeiture could result in a loss of assets

103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

In re Badlands Energy, Inc., 608 B.R. at 867.
Id.
Id. at 868–73.
See In re Frederick Petroleum Corp., 98 B.R. 762, 763 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
Id. at 767.
Id. at 766.
Id. at 763.
Id. at 767.
Id.
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assigned to third parties uninvolved in and perhaps without notice of
the bankruptcy proceedings.112

Considering the above analysis, the district court reversed the bankruptcy court’s
ruling that the leases were deemed forfeited.113
F. Michigan
In Michigan, caselaw suggests that oil and gas leases are treated as actual
leases subject to rejection under Section 365.114 In a decision unrelated to
Section 365, the Michigan Supreme Court attempted to provide guidance on
what interests are created in an oil and gas lease.115 In Energetics, the Court
noted that oil and gas leases transfer only an interest in the oil and gas,116 and in
doing so, the Court cited a prior case in which the Court held that oil and gas
remain part of the realty until they are severed from it.117 The Court went on to
state that lessors in an oil and gas lease retain a reversionary interest in the
remaining minerals upon termination of the lease, characterizing such a
reversionary interest as a leasehold interest reverting back to the property
owner.118 However, in support of this proposition, the Court cited two Texas
cases.119 As noted above, Texas law does not consider an oil and gas lease as
conveying a leasehold interest, but rather a freehold interest in real property.120
It is unclear why the Michigan Supreme Court would choose to cite Texas
law to support a proposition that is somewhat fundamentally at odds with the
way in which Texas treats oil and gas rights, and this perplexing choice was
noted and discussed by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of Michigan in Frontier Energy, LLC v. Aurora Energy, Ltd..121 In
Aurora, Section 365 was at issue, and the Energetics decision was one of many
cases to which the court attempted to determine whether oil and gas leases could

112

Id.
Id.
114
See Energetics, Ltd. v. Whitmill, 497 N.W.2d 497, 502 (Mich. 1993).
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. (citing Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 568 (Tex. 1991) and Kaiser v. Love, 358 S.W.2d
586, 587 (Tex. 1962)).
120
See River Prod., Co. v. Webb (In re Topco, Inc.), 894 F.2d 727, 739 n.16 (5th Cir. 1990).
121
Frontier Energy, LLC v. Aurora Energy, Ltd. (In re Aurora Oil & Gas Corp.), 439 B.R. 674, 678
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010) (“[T]he [Michigan] Supreme Court characterized the reversionary interest as a
‘leasehold’ interest that reverts to the ‘interest owner,’ even though it cited Texas law which generally treats a
lessee’s interest as a fee.”).
113
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in fact be rejected pursuant to the statute.122 After discussing Energetics, the
court turned to a 1942 Michigan Supreme Court decision in which the Court
held that a lessee in an oil and gas agreement is “but a lessee for a determinable
term and [is] not seised of an estate of inheritance.”123 While not exactly on point
(this case dealt with Michigan’s dower statute rather than the Code124), the
Aurora court found the language helpful in determining that Michigan law
“treats a lessee’s interest as a leasehold or profit á prendre, but not a freehold
estate.”125
After having reached this conclusion, the court went on to discuss the plain
meaning of the word “lease,” citing the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, stating that lease commonly means:
[1] an agreement by the owner of property (the lessor) to allow
exclusive possession of that property by another person (the lessee),
[2] for a defined period of time, [3] in exchange for payment (“rent”)
by the lessee, [4] with the property reverting to the lessor at the end of
the lessee’s period of possession.126

The court then stated that the oil and gas leases at issue fell squarely within this
definition of a lease, noting that the lessor conveyed an interest to the lessee in
exchange for rent and royalty payments.127 Holding that the interest conveyed
amounted to a leasehold interest, and thus an unexpired lease subject to
assumption or rejection under Section 365, the court declined to analyze the
agreements with respect to executory contracts.128
G. Pennsylvania
In Pennsylvania, caselaw seems to suggest that whether an oil and gas lease
is deemed a lease or executory contract depends on the timing of the bankruptcy
filing.129 Much of what is understood about the current interpretation of oil and
gas leases in Pennsylvania can be gleaned from the 2012 Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania decision in T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka.130 Since the
122
123

See generally id. at 676.
Id. at 678–79 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010) (discussing Redman v. Shaw, 1 N.W.2d 555, 556–57 (Mich.

1942)).
124

See generally Redman v. Shaw, 1 N.W.2d 555, 556 (Mich. 1942).
See In re Aurora Oil & Gas Corp., 439 B.R. at 678.
126
Id. at 679 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010) (citing In re Res. Tech. Corp., 254 B.R. 215, 225–26 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 2000)).
127
Id.
128
See id. at 680.
129
See T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 267 (Pa. 2012).
130
See generally id..
125
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decision was published, it has been cited eighty times by lower courts and nearly
200 times in various other publications.131 One of the hallmark principals of
Jedlicka is the Court’s determination that oil and gas leases should be construed
in accordance with the terms contained within the agreement—that oil and gas
leases are contracts by nature and should be evaluated pursuant to contract
law.132 Additionally, Jedlicka informs lower courts’ understanding of habendum
clauses in oil and gas leases—such clauses typically provide that parties to an
oil and gas lease will continue to be bound by that agreement until such a time
when oil and gas is no longer produced “in paying quantities.”133
Perhaps due to the extensive discussion of oil and gas leases construed as
contracts in Jedlicka, at least one lower court reached a sweeping general
opinion which was subsequently found to be erroneous.134 In Powell v.
Anadarko E&P Co., L.P. (In re Powell), the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania opined on the nature of oil and gas leases with respect
to contract law.135 Ultimately, the bankruptcy court reached the conclusion that
all oil and gas leases commence as either executory contracts or leases, and only
after oil and gas has been produced does an interest in property vest.136 While
this discussion is no more than dicta holding no precedential value, the lessor in
the case appealed the decision, despite the fact that the final order was in his
favor.137 The district court, upon appeal, held that the lessor had standing to
appeal the order, as such a determination by the bankruptcy court materially
changed the lessor’s interest in the property and could have a prejudicial effect
should there be further proceedings.138

131
See, e.g., SLT Holdings, LLC v. Mitch-Well Energy, Inc., 249 A.3d 888, 897 (Pa. 2021) (citing T.W.
Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261 (Pa. 2012)).
132
T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co., 42 A.3d at 267 (“[A] lease is in the nature of a contract and is controlled
by principles of contract law. It must be construed in accordance with the terms of the agreement…”).
133
Id. at 268.
134
See Powell v. Anadarko E&P Co., L.P. (In re Powell), 482 B.R. 873, 878 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2012),
vacated in part, remanded to Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Powell (In re Powell), No. 13-00035, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 152509, at *13–17 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2015).
135
See id. (noting that it is difficult to determine whether an oil and gas lease is an executory contract).
136
Id.

That court concluded, until oil or gas is produced, no freehold estate vests in the lessee. Logically
then, if, at the time bankruptcy was filed and there was no oil or gas produced—as is true in this
case—then contract principles would apply including an interpretation of whether this was an
executory contract or lease.
Id. (interpreting precedent).
137
See Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Powell (In re Powell), No. 13-00035, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
152509, at *1–2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2015).
138
Id. at *10–12.
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The district court went on to cite several prior Pennsylvania cases, holding
that “an oil and gas lease conveys a fee simple determinable estate in the oil and
gas to the lessee at the time the lease is executed.”139 The district court also noted
that Jedlicka was not the first Pennsylvania Supreme Court Case holding that a
“lease is in the nature of a contract and is controlled by principles of contract
law.140 However, the district court suggested that the two ideas above were not
mutually exclusive.141 In its analysis, the district court noted that in discussing
oil and gas leases with respect to contract law, “[t]he Bankruptcy Court cited
this as though it were a new principle that Jedlicka created to supersede
preexisting case law and to transform oil and gas leases from real property
conveyances to mere contracts.”142 The court went further in noting that while
Pennsylvania courts do interpret leases according to contract principles, that
should not be interpreted to mean that any lease is nothing more than a
contract.143
The district court then went on to analyze the importance of the language
within the lease in determining how such an agreement should be treated.144
Citing a prior opinion, the court noted:
[T]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered a conveyance of oil and
gas rights to be a grant of fee simple when the conveyance did not use
the term “lease,” but, like Jedlicka, included a “habendum clause
which states: To have and to hold the said lands and rights unto the
Grantee for the term of twenty years from the date hereof, and as much
longer as . . . oil or gas is found or produced in paying quantities.”145

With this analysis, In re Powell and its subsequent appellate history does not
necessarily provide guidance on exactly how Pennsylvania law interprets oil and
gas leases with respect to Section 365, but rather how courts in Pennsylvania
should not interpret Jedlicka and its predecessors and successors.146 The district
court did not take the time to analyze the agreement between the parties in
dispute with respect to its opinion, but rather vacated the prior order in part and

139

Id. at *8.
Id. at *13.
141
See also id. at *13–15.
142
Id. at *14.
143
See id. at *15 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2015).
144
See id. at *16–17 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2015).
145
Id. at *17–18 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2015) (citing Brown v. Haight, 255 A.2d 508, 511 (Pa. 1969)).
146
See id. at *22–23 (“In summary, there is nothing in Jedlicka or the later cases applying it that supports
the Bankruptcy Court’s opinion that it created a general rule to apply to all leases regardless of the linguistics
used in each one.”).
140
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remanded the case back to the lower court to make a determination in accordance
with the district court’s analysis.147
Furthermore, the district court in Powell as well as the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court failed to solve the ultimate question at hand—do all oil and gas
leases in Pennsylvania convey a fee simple determinable interest in property at
the moment they are executed?148 “The Supreme Court’s decision in Jedlicka
informs us that it has not adopted a general rule of law that would answer this
question.”149
In summary, the above-mentioned cases span a variety of states and
jurisdictions leading to a multitude of outcomes for lessors and lessees alike.
Variation exists not only from state to state, but often within individual states.
Interestingly, as demonstrated above, courts seem to be more than willing to cite
to cases outside of their own jurisdiction when analyzing oil and gas leases, but
often either misinterpret or misuse prior case history to reach their
conclusions.150 While the caselaw discussed above is somewhat dense and often
confusing, that confusion speaks to the problematic nature of attempting to force
oil and gas leases into categories where they do not belong. If, as it seems, courts
cannot come to an agreement on the issue, how do we expect the average
landowner to make an informed decision when entering into agreements with oil
and gas producers? Below, this Comment will analyze why such dramatic
variation exists and what that variation means for parties to oil and gas
agreements.
II. ANALYSIS
Before addressing the effect these disparities are likely to have on parties to
oil and gas agreements and how to remedy those effects, the underlying causes
of such disparities must first be addressed. The two most likely reasons for these
disparities are: (1) state property law varies greatly throughout the country and
bankruptcy courts are often asked to analyze leases pursuant to property laws in
states other than the state in which the court sits; and (2) oil and gas law is
incredibly complex, leaving courts in jurisdictions lacking experience in oil and
gas law at a disadvantage when asked to provide analysis.

147

Id. at *23.
See id. at *24.
149
Id. at *24–25.
150
See, e.g., Energetics, Ltd. v. Whitmill, 497 N.W.2d 497, 502, 506 (Mich. 1993) (looking to decisions
from the Texas Supreme Court in its discussion of reversionary rights).
148
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The most obvious reason why courts have reached varying conclusions
about the nature of oil and gas leases is that property laws are state specific, and
bankruptcy courts are bound to comply with the property laws of whichever state
the property in question is located.151 Oil and gas entities, such as the many noted
above, may hold property in multiple jurisdictions, requiring bankruptcy courts
to analyze each lease with respect to the laws of the state in which the property
exists. In Butner, the Supreme Court declined to review the state law in question,
noting that “federal judges who deal regularly with questions of state law in their
respective districts and circuits are in a better position than we to determine how
local courts would dispose of comparable issues.”152
If the Supreme Court recognizes that judges who are familiar with laws of
their own jurisdictions are “better suited” to decide issues arising out of state
law,153 then why does our current bankruptcy system frequently allow out of
state bankruptcy judges and district court judges to analyze property laws of far
off jurisdictions?154 In Sabine, the property in dispute was located in Texas and
was thus governed by Texas property law.155 Yet, because the debtor filed for
bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York, all matters arising out of that
petition were decided in New York by New York judges.156 Similarly, in J.H.
Land & Cattle, the property in dispute was located in Kansas but all matters
concerning the property were decided in the Western District of Oklahoma.157 It
should be noted, however, that Oklahoma and Kansas fall within the same
federal district.158 Nonetheless, the analysis used in J.H. Land & Cattle has been
subsequently questioned by other courts attempting to rule on oil and gas leases
in Kansas.159
The Sabine decision has been discussed at great length in articles published
by law firms working within the oil and gas industry and has been described as
151

See also Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 53, 55–56 (1979).
Id. at 58.
153
Id.
154
See generally In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. 66, 69, 70 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (analyzing
Texas property law); In re J.H. Land & Cattle Co., 8 B.R. 237, 238 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981) (analyzing Kansas
property law).
155
See In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. at 70.
156
See id. at 69.
157
In re J.H. Land & Cattle Co., 8 B.R. at 238.
158
See Geographic Boundaries of United States Courts of Appeals and United States District Courts, U.S.
CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/federal-courts-public/court-website-links (demonstrating
that both Oklahoma and Kansas are located in the Tenth Circuit).
159
See Baker Farms, Inc. v. Sandridge E&P, LLC (In re Sandridge Energy, Inc.), 2018 Bankr. LEXIS
318, at *32–33 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2018); In re Heston Oil Co., 69 B.R. 34, 36 (N.D. Okla. 1986)
(questioning the reasoning used in J.H. Land & Cattle).
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“unwelcome” to parties to gas gathering agreements.160 However, it has also
been noted that the decision has no precedential value outside of the Second
Circuit161—but is that really a consolation to parties to oil and gas agreements?
Many Chapter 11 cases are in fact filed in the Second Circuit,162 implying that
the precedent set in Sabine may continue to be a thorn in the side of parties to
midstream gas gathering agreements and other similar agreements. On the
contrary, the Alta Mesa and Badlands decisions tend to give a more favorable
outlook to parties to midstream gas gathering agreements in places like Utah and
Oklahoma, but again, such a consolation only goes so far as easing the concerns
of parties in those very specific regions. Even so, as discussed in many cases
above, the location of the property concerning the dispute seems to be a
relatively small factor when compared with the venue in which such a dispute
may be resolved.
Just like state property law, oil and gas law brings with it its own problems.
The court in Aurora described oil and gas law as arcane.163 It cannot be ignored
that courts throughout the country undoubtedly have varying degrees of
expertise in interpreting oil and gas agreements.164 So, not only are bankruptcy
courts expected to be able to decipher state property law from states outside of
their normal purview, they also must interpret provisions in contracts touching
on an area of law that is seen as “arcane.”165 Considering the nature of oil and
gas leases as having intertwined state property law with oil and gas law, it is
unsurprising that courts seem to use varying methods of analysis and reach
varying conclusions when asked to rule on these agreements with respect to
Section 365.

160
Mark G. Douglas & Paul Green, Oil and Gas Industry Update – Sabine Oil Not the Last Word on
Treatment of Gathering Agreements in Bankruptcy, JDSUPRA (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/oil-and-gas-industry-update-sabine-oil-57893/ (“The decision was unwelcome news to gas gathering
and handling agreement counterparties.”).
161
Matt Ochs et al., The Sabine Decision and its Effect on Midstream Agreements, Address at ABA Panel:
What the “Frack” is Going On? (Mar. 28, 2019) (transcript available at https://www.hollandhart.com/files/78734
_what_the_frack_is_going_on_lboyle.pdf).
162
See supra note 160 (“The Southern District of New York and Delaware have long been the preferred
forums for large chapter 11 cases.”).
163
See Frontier Energy, LLC v. Aurora Energy, Ltd. (In re Aurora Oil & Gas Corp.), 439 B.R. 674, 679
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010).
164
Number of Exploration and Production (E&P) Company Bankruptcy Filings in the United States from
2015 to June 2020 by State, Statista (July 15, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/1134295/us-upstreamoil-company-bankruptcy-filings-by-state/ (Showing that Texas led the nation in oil exploration and production
bankruptcies with 109, while second place Delaware saw only 34 oil bankruptcies).
165
In re Aurora Oil & Gas Corp., 439 B.R. at 679.
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As noted briefly above, forum selection plays a large role in predicting the
outcomes of a bankruptcy proceeding. The savvy corporate debtor is likely well
aware of its options when it considers how and where to proceed with a
bankruptcy petition, but where does this leave other parties to oil and gas
agreements?
With the exception of Chapter 15,166 a corporation has the option of filing
for bankruptcy in its state of incorporation, its principal place of business, or the
district in which it holds its principal assets.167 Although bankruptcy may not be
on the minds of parties to an oil and gas agreement at the outset, failure to
consider the implications of insolvency could prove detrimental to parties to
such agreements. However, an individual landowner entering into an agreement
with a large oil and gas corporation is unlikely to be aware of not only the state
property laws concerning the agreement, but also of the fact that the “leased”
property could become the subject of great dispute in the event that the corporate
lessee finds itself in a precarious financial situation. Equal risk does not exist
when the tables are turned—the corporation is far better situated in terms of
predicting the outcome of a potential bankruptcy filing by the landowner.
A. Effect on Parties to the Agreement
It is important, not only to evaluate not only the effects of uncertainty
surrounding Section 365 on parties to oil and gas agreements, but also the effect
on each party with respect to each varying precedent.
In many jurisdictions, courts have ruled that oil and gas leases convey a
freehold or fee interest in real property.168 As noted above, some courts have
held that this interest is conveyed at the time the agreement is made, whereas
other courts have held that the interest vests in property vests when oil is
produced on the property.169 Regardless of when such an interest vests, if it has
in fact vested, such holdings have strong implications for both the lessor and the
lessee. When the debtor is the landowner (the “lessor”) in an oil and gas lease, a
jurisdiction which views such a lease as conveying a freehold interest would act
166

See 28 U.S.C. § 1410 (2018).
28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2018).
168
E.g., River Prod., Co. v. Webb (In re Topco, Inc.), 894 F.2d 727, 740 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Heston Oil
Co., 69 B.R. 34, 36 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986); Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Powell (In re Powell), No. 1300035, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152509 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2015).
169
Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Powell (In re Powell), No. 13-00035, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152509,
at *5–7, 23 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2015) (suggesting that some agreements may be interpreted to convey an interest
in property at the outset of the agreement, while others may be interpreted as vesting when oil and gas is
produced).
167
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to ensure that the lease is not considered unexpired leases or executive contracts
pursuant to Section 365. As a practical matter, prohibiting the lessor from
rejecting the lease would tend to ensure that the lessee continues to have the right
to use the land and thus provide continuing royalty payments to the lessor, which
generates income for the debtor. This continued income flow could arguably be
construed as beneficial to the estate. Additionally, because the trustee or debtor
in possession owes a fiduciary duty to the estate, rejecting such an agreement
would likely be prohibited under the Code.170
In the event that the debtor is the lessee, designation of oil and gas leases as
conveying freehold interests may create a less desirable effect. As noted in the
discussion of many of the decisions above, agreements conveying a freehold or
fee interest are not typically construed as unexpired leases or executory
contracts, and thus they are not subject to rejection under Section 365. Because
the bankrupt lessee is not free to simply walk away from leases which are
deemed to convey a freehold interest, he may be obligated to continue to perform
under the agreement even if it is financially burdensome. Although the trustee is
burdened with the task of deciding what to do with leases and executory
contracts to maximize the estate, the option to reject a lease that conveys a fee
interest is, in most cases, decidedly off the table. While an unexpired lease or
executory contract can be rejected at the discretion of the debtor in possession
pursuant to the “business judgment” test,171 no such test exists where an
agreement is not considered a true lease. The lessor, on the other hand, enjoys
the assurance of continued performance by the debtor or his assignees.
The effect on the parties is largely the same in jurisdictions which treat oil
and gas leases as unexpired leases or executory contract. If the lease agreement
is rejected, the debtor is considered to be in breach of the lease or contract,
entitling the other party to sue for damages. If the debtor in such a jurisdiction
is the lessor, although he is free to make an attempt to reject the agreement, such
rejections must be approved by the court.172 If the court finds that such a
rejection would be in opposition to the best interests of the estate, then the debtor
will likely be unable to reject the lease. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario
in which such a rejection would work against the best interests of the estate,
particularly if the debtor would continue to collect royalty payments from the
lessee. Furthermore, allowing a landowner to reject such an agreement is likely
170

See generally 11 U.S.C. § 704 (2018).
In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. 66, 71 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“The bankruptcy court
generally defers to a debtor’s determination as to whether rejection of an executory contract is advantageous,
unless the decision to reject is the product of bad faith, whim, or caprice.”).
172
11 U.S.C. § 365 (2018).
171
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to lead to inequitable results for the lessee. Oil and gas exploration is expensive
and time consuming, and such a breach by the lessor is arguably burdensome
despite its ability to sue for damages. Furthermore, recovering damages from a
bankrupt party is unlikely to be fruitful, potentially leaving the lessee with no
equitable recourse.
When the debtor is the lessee, as is often the case, jurisdictions which
consider oil and gas leases to be unexpired leases or executory contracts tend to
lead to the most favorable results for the lessee. In such situations, the debtor
has the discretion to either reject or assume the lease, and courts generally
approve rejections as long as they satisfy the “business judgment” test.173 This
gives the corporate debtor the ability to free itself from the burden of
performance under agreements which are less productive by rejecting them or
continue to make use of fruitful agreements by assuming them. If the lease is
rejected, then the lessor may exercise the reversionary right to his property and
the ability to recover damages. However, depending upon the financial situation
of the debtor, recovering damages may be difficult.
None of the aforementioned analyses has even begun to address the effect of
each outcome on third parties who may also be involved in the exploration,
production or gas gathering process. Midstream gas gathering agreements, such
as the one discussed in Sabine, are often comprised of many parties working
cooperatively to achieve a common goal.174 The Sabine decision brings with it
the implication that landowners as well as any other party to such an agreement
might be left with little recourse if a party to the agreement files for bankruptcy
in a jurisdiction following Sabine’s precedent.
In summary, the current system provides no consistency for lessors, lessees,
and third parties to rely upon when entering into oil and gas agreements. Imagine
the hypothetical landowner in Louisiana who enters into an oil and gas
agreement with an oil and gas producer who has its principal place of business
in Texas but whose assets are primarily held in New York. What should either
party expect if its counterpart files for bankruptcy? The simple answer is: it
depends. “It depends” is not uncommon in the law—we accept the ambiguity,
understanding that it serves the adversarial process well. However, in this
scenario, “it” depends on so many factors that the likelihood of accurately
predicting the outcome is seemingly impossible. The potential for inequitable

173
In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. at 71 (explaining that the business judgment test is different
from that of corporate law in that the decision must be beneficial to the estate).
174
Id. at 69 n.3.
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results is highly problematic and needs to be addressed not only to prevent
disparities, but also to provide insight for future contracting parties.
III. THE PROBLEM WILL PERSIST
The need for a solution is exacerbated by the fact that oil and gas companies
will likely face financial struggles in the near future, leading to an increase in
bankruptcy filings. The cases discussed above span from the mid-1900’s all the
way to 2019. Oil and gas has been a part of the national economy for at least a
century, during which time the country has experienced so-called oil booms
followed by so-called oil busts. Historically, these booms and busts have been
cyclical—booms (periods where oil production results in a heavy inflow of
income for oil producers) are followed by busts (periods where oil production
yields low profits).175
There is not much debate about what causes oil booms and busts. When oil
supply is low and demand is high, oil producers ramp up production to meet the
demand, leading to increases in profits.176 In contrast, when oil supply is high
and there is a drop in demand, producers are forced to reduce the price of their
product, leading to a decline in profits.177 In the past there have been a variety
of reasons for decline in oil demand, such as energy efficient measures aimed at
reducing energy consumption.178
The last oil bust occurred in 2015 and 2016, leading to a huge spike in
bankruptcy filings by oil and gas companies.179 In 2015 alone, over sixty oil and
gas companies filed for bankruptcy—a 379% increase over the prior year.180
That round of bankruptcies was largely caused by plummeting oil prices during
the infamous OPEC price war.181 The oil slump eventually did see a rebound—
175
See Nawar Alsaadi, Why Oil Booms And Busts Happen, OILPRICE.COM (Feb. 25, 2016, 3:22 PM),
https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Why-Oil-Booms-And-Busts-Happen.html.
176
Oil Booms And Busts: What Causes Them?, ENERGYHQ, https://energyhq.com/2017/07/oil-boomsand-busts-what-causes-them/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2022).
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Matt Egan, U.S. Oil Bankruptcies Spike 379%, CNN: BUSINESS (Feb. 11, 2016, 10:59 AM), https://money.
cnn.com/2016/02/11/investing/oil-prices-bankruptcies-spike/index.html.
180
Id.
181
OPEC refused to reduce production, leading to a dramatic decline in oil prices. See generally Alex
Lawler et al., Saudis Block OPEC Output Cut, Sending Oil Price Plunging, REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2014),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-opec-meeting/saudis-block-opec-output-cut-sending-oil-price-plungingidUSKCN0JA0O320141128 (OPEC’s refusal to scale back oil production led to a reduction in global oil prices,
placing competitive economic pressure on U.S. shale producers that contend with high production costs); Oil
Prices Plunge After OPEC Meeting, BBC NEWS (Nov. 28, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/business30223721 (OPEC’s decision to allow prices to continually decline was followed by a dramatic increase in oil
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by 2018 U.S. oil markets were producing at all-time highs, signaling another oil
boom.182 But, oil booms are cyclical, and even before concerns about the
COVID-19 pandemic began circulating, fears of an oil bust in 2020 were
rumored.183 The U.S. oil market became saturated with oil producers saddled in
massive amounts of debt, and as the U.S. became the world’s largest producer
of oil, the increase in supply caused a decline in price, making investors
nervous.184
When all was said and done, investors were right to be nervous in late
2019—the global pandemic all but laid waste to the oil and gas industry. Over
100 oil and gas producers filed for bankruptcy in 2020.185 This round of
bankruptcies seemed to be caused by the perfect storm. As mentioned before,
the overwhelming supply of oil in 2019 was already causing a dip in prices,
narrowing profit margins for producers. That coupled with the fact that the
pandemic severely limited air travel and commuting, oil producers all over the
world were suddenly sitting on enormous oil reserves and no one to buy the
product.
In early 2021, a new presidential administration has emerged, bringing with
it a high probability of new regulations on oil and gas producers in the United
States.186 While it still remains to be seen what effect proposed regulation might
have on the industry as a whole, it can be assumed that broader regulatory
schemes will come with costly changes for the nation’s oil and gas producers.
As a first step toward promoting clean energy, the Biden administration
temporarily suspended oil and gas leasing on federal land, stoking fear among
industry leaders that further restrictions may come in the near future.187 To put
and gas bankruptcies in the United States).
182
David Blackmon, New Report Details Record Oil Boom in 2018, FORBES (Feb. 13, 2019, 12:59 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidblackmon/2019/02/13/new-report-details-record-texas-oil-boom-in2018/?sh=44e28ad57012 (“Texas is in the midst of the single largest oil boom its economy has ever seen.”).
183
See Alex Kimani, 2020: The Year of the Oil Bankruptcies, OILPRICE.COM (Dec. 27, 2019, 5:00 PM),
https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/2020-The-Year-Of-The-Oil-Bankruptcies.html.
184
See id.
185
Paul Takahashi, Over 100 Oil and Gas Companies Went Bankrupt in 2020, HOUSTON CHRON. (Jan. 20,
2021, 12:09 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/More-than-100-oil-and-gas-companiesfiled-for-15884538.php?converted=1.
186
The Biden-Harris campaign emphasis on a need for clean and renewable energy sources has been
effectuated by enacting a host of moratoriums on oil and gas leases as well as canceling the permit for the
Keystone XL Pipeline – all of which has been a major concern for players in the oil and gas industry. See
Bloomberg et al., Biden Moves to Rapidly Adopt Climate Policies, Stunning the Oil and Gas Industry, FORTUNE
(Jan. 28, 2021, 6:01 AM), https://fortune.com/2021/01/28/biden-climate-oil-and-gas/.
187
James Osborne, Biden Suspends Federal Oil and Gas Leasing for 60 Days, HOUSTON CHRON. (Jan. 21,
2021, 7:17 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/Biden-suspends-federal-oil-andgas-leasing-15888032.php.
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the temporary suspension into perspective, oil production on federal land makes
up over twenty percent of production in the United States.188
While it remains to be seen what impact, if any, additional regulations might
have on the economic health of oil and gas companies, it is clear that external
factors such as a pandemic create an unpredictable economic environment for
energy producers that could lead to additional increases in bankruptcies in
coming years. Unfortunately, each of those potential proceedings is likely to be
governed by the caselaw described above, with no uniform analysis or outcome.
In light of all of the above discussion, we must ask—are we ok with this?
Are we willing to accept that sometimes bankruptcy operates as a zero-sum
game where someone inevitably loses? Largely, the answer is likely yes. We
know that creditors, for example, sometimes come out of a bankruptcy filing
with no distribution. After all, if the purpose of bankruptcy is to give the honest
but unfortunate debtor a fresh start, someone is going to lose. That’s fine. What
we should not accept is that parties to oil and gas agreements have no way of
knowing how the potential insolvency of their counterparts might affect them,
and thus no real way of guarding against it. One might suggest that parties to oil
and gas agreements draft better contracts—plan for the uncertainty by way of
extremely explicit agreements. It’s not a terrible suggestion, but the reality is,
individual landowners lack the information and resources necessary to
effectively protect themselves when entering into oil and gas agreements. In fact,
a landowner might actually be hesitant to enter into an agreement that grants
freehold interests in his property to an oil and gas company. He may not realize
that granting a freehold interest could potentially shield him from having the
agreement rejected in a bankruptcy proceeding. Additionally, the argument for
writing better contracts misses the point entirely. The problem isn’t just about
injustice and inequity, it’s really about inefficiency. We need a solution to
prevent courts from entertaining endless litigation in an attempt to figure out
what an oil and gas lease actually is. Bankruptcy courts are often referred to as
courts of equity, but that description fails to accurately capture what bankruptcy
courts do.189 Bankruptcy courts are not like other courts of equity—they are
bound by complex rules including not only the Code, but also the Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, state and local
rules190, and of course, as discussed above, state property laws.

188

Id.
Marcia S. Krieger, “The Bankruptcy Court Is a Court of Equity”: What Does That Mean?, 50 S. C. L.
REV. 275, 275–76 (1999).
190
Id. at 309.
189
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To sum it up, “[w]hen judges and attorneys recognize and acknowledge that
the bankruptcy court is a statutory court charged with implementing social
policy law, predictability in outcome will increase, and therefore, litigants’
confidence in the bankruptcy process will increase as well.”191 If the court
system hasn’t figured it out by now, maybe it’s time for a different approach.
The legislature needs to recognize that Bankruptcy courts are trying to fulfill
their duties by following the statutory construction of code Section 365,
however, in doing so, too little guidance is given and disparate results are
inevitably reached.
IV. IS THERE A SOLUTION?
The discussion below seeks to answer the following questions:
1. What type of legislation, if any, could resolve the problems surrounding
the variation in the treatment of oil and gas leases as well as midstream
gas gathering agreements under Section 365?
2. Would any such legislation be constitutional?
After digging deeply into the relevant caselaw surrounding oil and gas
leases, one’s first impression is likely to be that however unfortunate some of
the outcomes may be to lessors and lessees alike, not much can be done. After
all, courts are bound by the principles set forth in Butner.192 Disputes arising out
of state property law must be decided by analyzing the laws of the state in which
the property is located unless some countervailing federal interest exists.193
Additionally, debtors are free to file for bankruptcy in any state that meets the
statutory requirements set forth in U.S.C. 28 § 1408 or § 1410, depending on
which chapter under which they have filed.194 None of the decisions discussed
above can be construed as examples in which a court or a debtor has run afoul
of precedent or any federal statute. But alas, despite the fact that the actors
mentioned above have acted inside the bounds of the law, the outcome is still
problematic.
Perhaps then, it would be prudent to look to the Butner principle and
determine if, in fact, some countervailing federal interest does exist in relation
to oil and gas leases. When it comes to the oil and gas industry as a whole, there
191

Id. at 311.
See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 49 (1979).
193
Id. at 55.
194
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2018) (specifying venue for Title 11 cases except those provided for in 28
U.S.C. § 1410), with 28 U.S.C § 1410 (2018) (specifying venue for chapter 15 cases).
192
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is very little doubt that a federal interest exists. This has been evidenced by
decades of fossil fuel subsidies provided by the federal government.195 It is
estimated that the United States currently subsidizes oil and gas production to
the tune of some $600 billion.196 Subsidies aren’t the only evidence of a strong
federal interest generally in oil and gas. The Bureau of Land Management is
tasked with managing millions of acres of oil and gas development activities.197
Additionally, Title 43 of the Code of Federal Regulations contains several
provisions dealing specifically with oil and gas leases.198 Even current executive
orders point to a federal interest in regulating oil and gas activities—the
executive branch has gone back and forth between permitting the construction
of the XL Keystone Pipeline and halting its progress over the last several
years.199
The aforementioned federal interests demonstrate that a strong federal
interest exists in the oil and gas industry in terms of production and regulation,
but without further analysis, it fails to demonstrate an interest in the outcomes
of individual bankruptcy cases that fall within the purview of oil and gas law.
After all, much of the regulation could be attributed to a broad federal interest
in protecting the environment or the economy. To make the connection between
a federal interest with respect to bankruptcy, a further discussion of the scope of
Code Section 365, as well as a discussion of congressional legislation aimed at
the aggregate effect on interstate commerce, is required.

195
Clayton Coleman & Emma Dietz, Fossil Fuel Subsidies: A Closer Look at Tax Breaks and Societal
Costs, ENV’T & ENERGY STUDY INST. (July 29, 2019), https://www.eesi.org/papers/view/fact-sheet-fossil-fuelsubsidies-a-closer-look-at-tax-breaks-and-societal-costs (“There is a long history of government intervention in
energy markets. Numerous energy subsidies exist in the U.S. tax code to promote or subsidize the production of
cheap and abundant fossil energy.”); Karl Evers-Hillstrom, Oil Producers Push Democrats to Preserve Key
Drilling Deduction, THE HILL (Aug. 26, 2021, 2:31 PM), https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/business-alobbying/569583-oil-producers-push-democrats-to-preserve-key-drilling (discussing a provision within the U.S.
tax code that allows oil companies to recover drilling costs).
196
Coleman & Dietz, supra note 195.
197
Federal Laws, U. COLO BOULDER: INTERMOUNTAIN OIL & GAS BMP PROJECT, http://www.
oilandgasbmps.org/laws/federal_law.php (last visited Feb. 22, 2022) (“The Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
leases minerals and manages oil and gas development activities on over 570 million acres of BLM and other
federal lands, as well as private lands where mineral rights have been retained by the federal government.”).
198
See generally Issuance of Leases 43 C.F.R. § 3100, subpart 3101 (pertaining to the issuance of leases).
199
A Look at the History of the Keystone XL Pipeline Expansion, CBC NEWS (Jan. 17, 2021, updated
Jan. 18, 2021), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/timeline-keystone-xl-pipeline-1.5877117 (In 2015, President
Obama vetoed a bill approving construction of the pipeline. In 2017 and 2019, President Trump took steps to
approve and speed up the construction of the pipeline. Then in 2021, President Biden revoked subsequent
permits, halting construction.); Rob Gillies, Keystone XL Pipeline Halted as Biden Revokes Permit, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (January 20, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-alberta-2fbcce48372f5c29c3ae6f6f93907a6d.
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At first glean, Section 365 seems like a somewhat broad provision, stating
that with few exceptions, the trustee, may assume or reject any unexpired lease
or executory contract, subject to the court’s approval.200 However, moving
further down the statute, it becomes clear that Congress actually carved out
specific provisions pertaining to leases specifically dealing with real property in
shopping centers.201 Additionally, the section contains additional provisions for
the rejection of timeshare interests as well as intellectual property licenses.202 To
answer the first question of whether any legislation could be enacted to remedy
the current problem, one could ask why Congress was willing to include such
specific provisions regarding shopping centers, time shares, and intellectual
property, and whether the same logical reasoning could then be extended to oil
and gas leases.
With respect to shopping centers, Section 365 provides specifications on
how to handle adequate assurances of future performance when such a lease has
been assumed or assigned.203 While such a provision does little to provide
insight on the rejection of such leases, it is clear that Congress intended to
provide some guidance on how this particular type of property should be handled
during a bankruptcy proceeding. For instance, part of the provision states that
“[a]dequate assurance of future performance of a lease of real property in a
shopping center includes adequate assurance . . . that assumption or assignment
of such lease will not disrupt any tenant mix or balance in such shopping
center.”204 This provision is specifically designed to protect not only landlords,
but also other tenants operating within the same shopping center.205 The question
then becomes, why would Congress feel the need to protect third party tenants,
when in non-bankruptcy law, such tenants would be unlikely to have a right to
object to another tenant’s assignment of a lease?206 It has been suggested that
the provision was intended to prevent landlords and tenants involved in shopping
200

11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2018).
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(3) (2018) (specifying adequate assurances of future performance with regard
to shopping centers).
202
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(h), (i), (n) (2018) (Subsection (i) pertains to timeshare interests and Subsection
(n) pertains to intellectual property licenses).
203
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(3) (2018).
204
11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(3)(D) (2018).
205
Pamela Smith Holleman & Magdalena Ellis, Reexamining the Protections Afforded to Solvent
Shopping Center Tenants Under § 365 in Light of In re Trak Auto Corp. Part II, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12, 51
(2005) (“Not only does the plain language of §365(b)(3) in no way restrict its application to landlords, to the
exclusion of non-debtor tenants, but the relevant legislative history strongly suggests that Congress intended that
non-debtor tenants have standing pursuant to §365(b)(3).”).
206
Id. at 52 (“Outside bankruptcy, however, a non-debtor tenant may not have a right to object to a
proposed use of the lease to be assigned, if and to the extent that the landlord did not have a right to preclude
that change in use.”).
201
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center leases from suffering “devastating ripple effects of a debtor’s
bankruptcy.”207
As discussed above, the rejection of an oil and gas lease or a gas gathering
agreement has implications not only for the parties to the agreement, but also to
third parties involved in the operation. While the industry itself, as well as the
nature of the leases, is quite different from that of a shopping center, the rights
of third parties are no less important, and yet no express provision exists to
protect those rights. Undoubtedly, landowners and third parties to gas gathering
agreements suffer a rippling effect when oil production companies are permitted
to reject those agreements in bankruptcy.
With respect to intellectual property, Section 365 carves out protections not
for third parties, but for licensees.208 Licenses for intellectual property are often
deemed to be executory contracts, meaning that the broad language of Section
365 permits the rejection of such licenses in the event that a licensor files for
bankruptcy.209 This provision is concerning for licensees because their rights to
intellectual property could be terminated upon the rejection of a license.210
Recognizing those concerns, Congress amended the Code in 1988, adding
section 365(n) to provide greater protection to parties to licensing agreements.211
Under section 365(n), “a licensee can elect to retain its rights to the licensed
intellectual property . . . [i]n return, the licensee must continue to make any
required royalty payment.”212 Although intellectual property licenses differ in
many ways from oil and gas leases, the concerns for a licensee are not so
different from the concerns of a lessee. As discussed above, if a lessor in an oil
and gas lease files for bankruptcy and the court deems the lease to be either an
unexpired lease or an executory contract, the lessee, who has poured time and
resources into the development of the production project, could be left with no
rights to continue to use the land. If this happens, the lessee would have no way
of extracting oil and generating revenue that he was relying upon when he
entered into the agreement. Creating some similar provision with respect to oil
and gas lessees might remedy the potentially detrimental effect to oil and gas
producers in the event of a bankruptcy on the part of the lessor. However, a
207

Id.
11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2018).
209
Bob Eisenbach, Protecting IP Rights from A Licensor’s Bankruptcy: What You Need to Know About
Section 365(n), COOLEY: IN THE RED (July 30, 2009), https://bankruptcy.cooley.com/2009/07/articles/businessbankruptcy-issues/protecting-ip-rights-from-a-licensors-bankruptcy-what-you-need-to-know-about-section365n/.
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provision this narrow would fail to address consequences when the tables are
turned, and therefore might prove to be inadequate.
Although Section 365 itself seems to imply that there is some federal interest
in the protection of parties to agreements that might fall under its purview, there
is possibly a stronger argument in favor of amending the Code to account for
problems encountered with oil and gas leases—interstate commerce. Even the
most basic understanding of constitutional law points to the simple fact that
Congress always has an interest in protecting commerce across state lines.
Though there are many, one example of Congress’ interest in regulating
interstate commerce is Wickard v. Filburn in which the Supreme Court held that
Congress has the power to regulate local activity if the activity could have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.213
Allowing debtors to reject oil and gas agreements could arguably have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. As noted in the above analysis of
caselaw, many gas gathering agreements and oil and gas leases are made
between parties of different states.214 Of course, the oil itself is then transported
across state lines and subsequently refined and sold to consumers across the
country. Narrowing our focus to midstream gas gathering agreements, there is
ample evidence that allowing for the rejection of such agreements is cause for
concern within the industry. After the Sabine decision,215 articles began popping
up all over the internet in which law firms and oil producers alike began
expressing those concerns.216 As noted in an article written in 2020:
[M]idstream companies make major, upfront financial commitments
to build the gas gathering infrastructure and processing facilities
necessary for the upstream producers to move their gas from the
wellhead to market . . . . That key covenant allows the midstream
company to recoup their investment over time.217

This observation points out what should be obvious—if bankruptcy courts
continue to allow rejection of gas gathering agreements and oil and gas leases,
213

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
See, e.g., In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. 66, 69–70 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016).
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Id. at 79 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (The court held that gas gathering agreements did not contain
covenants running with the land and therefore could be rejected.).
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fewer midstream companies will be willing to bear the risk of entering into the
agreements, or they will come at a much higher cost to account for the possibility
of insolvency.
Either possibility comes with a risk of having a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. A one-off event like the Sabine decision may seem
tolerable by itself, but decisions set precedent, and in the aggregate, there is
potential for serious consequences to interstate commerce with respect to oil and
gas. If fewer midstream companies are willing to enter into gas gathering
agreements, it’s likely to take upstream producers more time to find willing
participants, meaning oil products take longer to reach the market and thus the
consumer. At its most extreme, this means that there could be the possibility of
a shortage of oil and gas products throughout the country. At best, delays caused
by hesitance to enter into agreements might require upstream producers to slow
production—they can only extract as much oil as they can move or store.
Slowing production could lead to an increase in the cost of oil and gas products
for consumers—low availability and high demand will inevitably lead to a
higher price. Alternatively, midstream oil companies might choose to negotiate
for a higher royalty payment to make up for the possibility that some of their
contracts might end up being rejected in bankruptcy. Midstream companies that
enjoy the benefit of multiple gas gathering contracts could hedge against
potentially worthless agreements218 by contracting for more money initially.
That cost, of course would be pushed onto the consumer; regardless of what
decision midstream companies make in response to the wrench thrown into the
proverbial machine by the bankruptcy system, higher prices for oil and gas
products is likely to be the result. Higher gas prices at a time where economic
concerns abound is likely to lead consumers to make efforts to reduce their gas
consumption if possible. This potential for a disruption in the efficiency of oil
and gas production, as well as the potential negative effect on the consumer,
should motivate Congress to take steps to intervene by amending the bankruptcy
code.
V. PROPOSED AMENDMENT
To solve the enigmatic problem of oil and gas leases with respect to
bankruptcy code Section 365, any proposed legislation would need to
accomplish several things. First and foremost, the amendment would need to
seek to provide some level of consistency in bankruptcy proceedings.
Contracting parties should not be expected to enter into agreements without
218
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having a clear understanding of what might happen if the other party goes
bankrupt. Regardless of any notions of injustice, the Code should provide clear
and consistent outcomes so that parties are informed of all possibilities before
they contract. The current system provides little to no consistency in proceedings
regarding oil and gas lease analysis under Section 365.
Second, the amendment should provide some level of protection to actual or
perceived property interests conveyed in oil and gas leases and gas gathering
agreements. The argument has been made that contracting parties should
contract better. They should make certain that their agreements convey
covenants running with the land so courts don’t have to analyze state property
law to make a determination. That suggestion is far too lofty and unrealistic for
many parties to these types of agreements, and unsurprisingly, it is often made
by attorneys and judges without considering the audience. What such a
suggestion fails to consider is people don’t know what they don’t know. The
average landowner knows nothing of bankruptcy law, oil and gas law, or state
property law and therefore cannot possibly be expected to know how to protect
himself. Additionally, even in hiring an attorney, the average person is going to
be out-lawyered by any entity with the resources to explore and extract oil and
gas.
Lastly, any amendment should allow parties to agree contractually to the
rejection of an oil and gas lease if they should choose to do so. It’s possible that
an amendment that seeks to solve the above two problems might be viewed as
too rigid and at times impractical. If a proposed amendment disallows the
rejection of oil and gas leases regardless of the language in the agreement (which
might be necessary—the decision in Sabine was a direct result of the contractual
language and sent shockwaves through the industry), we might end up with
absurd results. This is true particularly in cases where a lease has been signed
but no exploration has even begun. The parties might be content to agree to
rejection and move on with their lives, and the Code shouldn’t prevent them
from doing so. Allowing the nonbankrupt party to provide express written
consent to rejection would alleviate that concern.
Ultimately Congress has the responsibility of deciding what type of
legislation would be sufficient to eliminate the problem of allowing the rejection
of oil and gas leases in bankruptcy. However, one simple suggestion would be
to add a provision within Code Section 365 that prohibits debtors who are parties
to gas gathering agreements and/or oil and gas leases from rejecting such
agreements without the express written consent of all parties to the agreement.
If Congress were to enact an amendment such as the one suggested, it would
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provide consistency and uniformity in the way oil and gas agreements are
handled throughout the country as well as provide protections to landowners and
oil production companies without being so restrictive as to produce an absurd
outcome.
CONCLUSION
The current language of Section 365 fails to adequately account for the
interests conveyed in oil and gas lease and gas gathering agreements and
therefore, an amendment is needed to counteract the overwhelming
inconsistencies in outcomes caused by the caselaw surrounding the issue. Oil
and gas leases are not leases at all—unlike the landlord-tenant relationship,
lessors and lessees in oil and gas leases do not determine possessory rights to
land based on a fixed term. Oil and gas leases can go on into perpetuity so long
as the lessee continues to produce oil. This type of conveyance is better
categorized as a fee simple determinable in which the lessee’s interest in the
property ends when he stops producing oil and that interest then reverts back to
the lessor.219 Nor are oil and gas leases properly categorized as executory
contracts. Courts and Congress alike have historically looked to the Countryman
definition which categorizes executory contracts as “a contract under which the
obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far
underperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would
constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other.”220 While
some oil and gas agreements might fit this definition, certainly, many do not.
Courts across the country have spent ample time mulling over state property
law and oil and gas law only to reach varying conclusions regarding oil and gas
leases in bankruptcy proceedings. There are likely several reasons for the
varying outcomes. First, oil and gas agreements are traditionally called “leases,”
which might signal a court to categorize them in that way despite the fact that
the content of the agreement conveys something more than a leasehold interest.
Second, the structure of the Code allows entities to potentially file for
bankruptcy in a variety of jurisdictions. This leads to situations in which a court
in one state is faced with the task of understanding property laws from whatever
state the “lease” happens to concern. Third, sometimes courts are simply lazy
with their analysis—citing cases from another state to support conclusions that
are at odds with what the case actually represents or neglecting to conduct
219
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property law analysis altogether and jumping straight to the conclusion that the
agreement must be an executory contract.221 And finally, oil and gas law is
complex, yet we expect inexperienced courts to fully understand the nature of
oil and gas agreements.
As a result of the problems faced by courts, the burden of shielding oneself
against detrimental results falls to the contracting parties, some sophisticated and
some less so. The current rise in bankruptcy filings by oil and gas companies
only serves to exacerbate the problem in the coming years. The lack of
predictability regarding oil and gas leases in bankruptcy proceedings needs to
be rectified through legislation in the form of an amendment to Code Section
365 disallowing the rejection of oil and gas agreements without consent of all
parties to the agreement.
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